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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY-IN

SEARCH OF A NEW TEST FOR ADMIRALTY TORT

JURISDICTION: THE AFTERMATH OF

I.

Executive Jet

INTRODUCTION

The traditional American "locality" test' for admiralty tort
(subject-matter) jurisdiction, which posits the occurrence 2 of the
tort on navigable waters3 as the controlling factor, has suffered
mounting criticism through the years because it has resulted in
unwarranted expansion of admiralty jurisdiction. Numerous federal courts consequently have suggested the need of an additional
requirement that the claim involve some sort of traditional maritime activity to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.' The Supreme
Court, however, used only the locality test prior to deciding
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,5 in'which the
Court found both the historical requirement of locality and a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" necessary
for admiralty jurisdiction.6 The holding in Executive Jet, however,
1. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971); The Plymouth, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). The Court in Victory Carriers cited over forty cases
utilizing the traditional test. 404 U.S. at 205 n.2.
2. The use of the locality test presents the question whether the place of injury
or the place of the conduct determines where the tort "occurs." This confusion
has proved to be a difficult area for the courts and has contributed to a lack of
uniformity in admiralty. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
409 U.S. 249 (1972). Compare Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206
(1963) with Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
3. Traditionally, all that has been considered in deciding whether waters are
navigable is whether the waters are or with reasonable improvement could be
made navigable; and all waters once navigable have been deemed to remain

navigable despite changed conditions. D.

ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM

118-19 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.
1967); Campbell v. H. Hackfield & Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903); McGuire v.
City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
5. 409 U.S. 249 (1972). See 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649 (1973).
6. 409 U.S. at 268.
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applied only to aviation accidents, 7 and in subsequent cases the
lower federal courts have struggled with the problem of Executive
Jet's application to other types of admiralty claims and the continued utility of the locality rule. A series of recent federal court
decisions illustrate this struggle and, therefore, offer a suitable
basis for.its evaluation.
II. BACKGROUND

The roots of the historic locality test for admiralty tort jurisdiction lie in fourteenth-century England, where the admiralty
courts' expanding jurisdiction8 proved intolerable to the common
law lawyers.9 In response, Parliament in 1389 restricted admiralty
jurisdiction to a "thing done upon the sea."'" By the early 1800's,
the English admiralty courts had established the locality test for
maritime torts, while requiring both a maritime nature and locale
for contract suits in admiralty." Responding to the lack of a definitive American jurisdictional rule for admiralty courts, in 1815 Jus7. "We hold that unless [a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity] exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in
admiralty in the absence of legislation to the contrary." 409 U.S. at 268.
8. English admiralty courts exercising civil jurisdiction, along with their original criminal jurisdiction, emerged in the fourteenth century. This civil jurisdiction was derived from civil law admiralty procedures of the Continent. See Chainlee, An Introduction to Admiralty, 22 MERCER L. REv. 523 (1971). The civil law
jurisdictional test for both contracts and torts was the maritime nature of the
dispute. Locality was therefore only an element in the determination of the nature. See Note, Admiralty JurisdictionOver Torts, 25 HAlv. L. REV. 381 (1912).
Fourteenth century English admiralty courts (before 1389) exercised similar jurisdiction. Id. at 381; Mears, The History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction,2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 312, 328-29 (1908).
9. Admiralty courts were more attractive to litigants because of the cumbersome procedural restraints found in the common law courts. The consequent loss
of fees suffered by the common law lawyers, coupled with a dislike for the denial
in admiralty of the right to jury trial, stimulated both parliamentary and judicial
action whenever admiralty expanded its jurisdiction. Note, New Guidelines for
Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction,48 IND. L.J. 87, 90 n.17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Guidelines].
10. Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1389, 13 Rich. 2, c. 5.
11. See A. BROWNE, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW, AND OF THE LAW
OF THE ADMIRALTY 72, 110 (1802). For an excellent history of English admiralty
jurisdiction to 1840 see Mears, supra note 8, at 312. For an account of English
admiralty jurisdiction to the present day see F. WISWALL, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE

1880 (1970).
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tice Story in De Lovio v. Boit 2 examined the English doctrine and
held that the American jurisdictional test for contracts in admiralty would require only a relationship to marine navigation, business or commerce. 13 Story concluded in dicta, however, that admiralty jurisdiction for torts was "necessarily bounded by locality.""
Although not excluding any additional factors in determining such
jurisdiction, his comments contained no implication that an additional test should be required. American lower courts thereafter
used this single criterion for torts in admiralty, but the Supreme
Court did not clearly adopt it until 1866 in The Plymouth, 5 where
the Court made what has become the classic statement of Ameri-can admiralty jurisdiction: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas
or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance."' 6
Unfortunately, this strict locality test has resulted in a failure
to satisfy either the purpose of admiralty, which is to provide a
body of law to deal with the special problems of maritime commerce, 17 or the justification of a federal admiralty court system,
which is uniformity within this special body of law. 8 Strict applications of the locality test have allowed claims which have no
relation to maritime commerce to be entertained in some admiralty courts, 9 and in so doing have fostered disagreement among
2
the courts concerning the encroachment of admiralty jurisdiction. 1
Those courts rejecting this expansion and the use of locality as the
exclusive test generally have found that the tort must also have
some relationship or connection with traditional maritime commerce or navigation.2 ' This revised jurisdictional rule is referred to
as the "locality-plus" or "locality-plus nexus" test.
7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass., Story, Circuit Justice, 1815).
7 F. Cas. at 444.
7 F. Cas. at 444 (dictum).
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 36.
409 U.S. at 269; Guidelines, supra note 9, at 88.
See Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D. Tex. 1968); 1 E.C.
BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 10, at 14-15 (6th ed. 1940).
19. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (swimmer injured by surfboard); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963) (injuries to water skier).
20. Compare cases in note 19 supra with cases in note 4 supra.
21. See note 4 supra.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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The Supreme Court refused, until recently, opportunities to
adopt the locality-plus test. In Atlantic Transport Co. of West
Virginia v. Imbrovek,22 the Court recognized a possible need for the
additional traditional maritime activity requirement, but held
that the sufficient nexus of the wrong to maritime service, navigation and commerce in that case necessitated no revision of the
locality rule. 23 As recently as 1971, the Court affirmed the traditional locality test in Victory Carriers,Inc. v. Law. 21 But in 1972,
while addressing the particularly vexing jurisdictional area of air
travel,2 5 the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. C ty
of Cleveland2 6 directly addressed the question whether locality
alone will suffice for admiralty jurisdiction. Immediately after
takeoff from an airport adjacent to Lake Erie, a business jet struck
a flock of seagulls that had been flushed from the runway. Some
of the birds were ingested in the plane's engines, causing a power
loss that forced the plane into the navigable waters of Lake Erie.
The plane's owners, Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., subsequently
sued the owner of the airport, the city of Cleveland, 27 in admiralty,
alleging negligence. 2 The District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio 29 applied a locality-plus nexus test, found that neither
requirement was satisfied, and dismissed for lack of admiralty
22. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
23. 234 U.S. at 62. Indeed, many courts evidently found it unnecessary to
consider an additional test because most cases arising on navigable waters involve
traditional maritime activity. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 254 (1972).
24. 404 U.S. 202 (1971). "The historic view of the Court has been that the
maritime tort jurisdiction of the federal courts is determined by the locality of
the accident and that maritime law governs only those torts occurring on the
navigable waters of the United States." 404 U.S. at 205.
25. An excellent discussion of Executive Jet's effects on aviation torts in admiralty is in Bell, Admiralty Jurisdictionin the Wake of Executive Jet, 15 ARIz.
L. REv. 67 (1973). See also Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.
St. Thom. & St. John 1973).
26. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
27. The airport manager and the air traffic controller, who was responsible for
clearing the aircraft for takeoff, were also named as defendants.
28. Plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently failed to keep the airport runway free of birds and to give adequate notice of their presence.
29. The district court's opinion is unreported, but it is summarized and reproduced in part in the text of the Supreme Court opinion. 409 U.S. at 251-52.
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jurisdiction." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal reasoning that because the alleged tort occurred on
land before the plane reached Lake Erie, it was unnecessary to
consider the question of maritime nexus. 3' Ignoring the question of
the locality of the tort, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
and held that the case was not cognizable in admiralty because the
alleged wrong bore no "significant relationship to traditional mari3' 2
time activity.
III.

RECENT DECISIONS

Various lower federal court decisions demonstrate the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the locality-plus test of
Executive Jet in general admiralty tort jurisdiction aside from
aviation torts. In Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp.,'33
an oil transfer line that linked the Hess plant with a tanker ruptured, causing
pollution of the Baltimore Harbor. Both Hess and the owner of the
tanker were sued in admiralty by Maryland's State Department of
Natural Resources. Following denial by the federal district court
of its motion to dismiss, ' defendant Hess moved for relief from the
order on the ground that Executive Jet's specific rejection of the
locality test bound the district court. The court disagreed, found
that Executive Jet held the locality test to be insufficient merely
in airplane accident cases, 35 and held that this case fell within the
court's admiralty jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that
only when there is a" 'perverse' or 'casuistic borderline situation'
is a deviation required from the traditional locality test.36
30. The district court reasoned that the alleged wrong occurred when the
plane ingested the birds over land; therefore, the first criterion of locality was not
met. Alternatively, the court found no relationship to traditional maritime activity because the operative facts concerned the dangers for land-based aircraft when
using runways for takeoff. 409 U.S. at 251-52.
31. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir.
1971).
32. 409 U.S. at 268. See note 7 supra.
33. 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973).
34. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
35. 356 F. Supp. at 976.
36. 356 F. Supp. at 977. The Supreme Court in Executive Jet had reasoned
that the locality test usually worked well since most tortious occurrences on
navigable waters involve traditional maritime activities. The words "perverse and
casuistic borderline situations" were used by the Court to describe when the
locality test causes problems. 409 U.S. at 255.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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In Adams v. Montana Power Co.;" the District Court for the
District of Montana recognized no binding authority in Executive
Jet for the use of the locality-plus test in nonaviation cases, but
nonetheless held, by using a modified version of the locality test,
that admiralty jurisdiction did not exist. Plaintiffs decedent had
drowned when a discharge of water from defendant's dam on the
Missouri River caused his small boat to overturn. Because local
dams bounding the stretch of river where the accident occurred
had reduced river commerce to that of any inland lake, defendant
contended that lack of traditional maritime activity should cause
the court to follow the policy of Executive Jet and adopt the
locality-plus test, which would bar the plaintiff's suit. The court
began its analysis by noting that the locality test granted admiralty jurisdiction when the tort occurred on navigable water. The
court felt, however, that the Supreme Court's refusal to apply
mechanically the locality test in Executive Jet diminishes the
binding force of the term "navigable water" and allows the courts
to make a wider inquiry into the admiralty tort jurisdictional problem." After recognizing that the purpose of admiralty is to serve
the needs of maritime commerce, the court claimed that "navigable water" is simply a useful term to describe where such commerce takes place.3 9 Therefore, the court felt that water is not
"navigable" for the purpose of the locality test unless it can support traditional maritime activity," which the stretch of river in
this case could not. Consequently, admiralty jurisdiction failed
under the court's version of the locality test because the act did
not occur on navigable water as redefined.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
relied more directly on the Supreme Court's holding in Executive
Jet. The plaintiff in Crosson v. Vance,4 a water skier, sued his
towboat driver in admiralty for negligent operation of the boat on
navigable waters. In dismissing the complaint in admiralty, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit specifically recognized the
binding authority of Executive Jet's rejection of the strict locality
rule4 2 and, noting the Supreme Court's explicit disapproval of the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973).
354 F. Supp. at 1111.
354 F. Supp. at 1112.
See note 3 supra.
484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973).
484 F.2d at 841. A more recent Fourth Circuit case reiterates the view of
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grant of admiralty jurisdiction in a previous case with similar
facts, determined that no significant traditional maritime activity
existed.43 In Kelly v. Smith,44 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, on the other hand, used Executive Jet as persuasive authority45 in conjunction with a prior Fifth Circuit case46 in upholding the lower court's judgment for the plaintiffs in admiralty. Kelly
involved an action for injuries sustained by poachers who were
fired on by defenders of a private hunting preserve on an island in
the Mississippi River. The court, concluding that maritime locality is no longer sufficient and that a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity is necessary, found the dangers to

Crosson. Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., No. 73-1354 (4th Cir., Dec. 7,
1973). A recent Ninth Circuit case also exhibits a definite understanding that
Executive Jet mandates a locality-plus test across the breadth of admiralty jurisdiction. In Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973), plaintiffs sought
to recover for certain damages to their pleasure craft that resulted from the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill. A three-judge panel of special masters held that the case
was within maritime law. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the finding
of locality would have been dispositive of the jurisdictional issue had not the
Executive Jet decision been handed down. 485 F.2d at 256. In affirming the
special masters' decision, the court found traditional maritime activity, but said
that if it had not, Executive Jet would "compel a reversal." 485 F.2d at 257.
43. 484 F.2d at 842. The similar case in which admiralty jurisdiction was
allowed is King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (injury to water
skier through negligence of towboat operator).
44. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
45. Two additional cases consider Executive Jet simply as guidance or persuasive authority outside the area of aviation torts in admiralty. Rubin v.
Power Authority, 356 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); Luna v. Star of India, 356
F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
46. Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972)
(locality is not an absolute requirement for the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction, but the facts and circumstances of each claim must have a substantial
connection with maritime activities or interests). This is known as the "maritime
nexus" or "maritime connection" test. Only one other American case adopts the
maritime nexus rule. Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968). For
articles supporting this test see Guidelines, supra note 9, and Pelaez, Admiralty
Tort Jurisdiction-TheLast Barrier,7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1968). The maritime
connection test has also suffered substantial criticism in the past. See, e.g., Note,
Admiralty-Tests of Maritime Tort Jurisdiction,44 Tut. L. REv. 166 (1969).
Except possibly in the Fifth Circuit, there is no movement in the courts at this
time that shows a willingness to take such a large step as adopting the maritime
nexus test in the admiralty tort area. See note 47 infra.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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maritime commerce presented in the case sufficient to justify invocation of federal admiralty jurisdiction.47

IV.

TOWARD MORE PROPER BOUNDS FOR ADMIRALTY TORT
JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court's adoption in Executive Jet of the
locality-plus nexus test for aviation torts in admiralty has placed
in doubt the jurisdictional standard for the entire area of admiralty
torts. The Court's statement that it is far more consistent with the
purpose and history of admiralty tort jurisdiction to require a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, 8 coupled
with the absence of subsequent Supreme Court decisions that
might interpret more explicitly the impact and applicability of the
Executive Jet holding to nonaviation cases, has left the lower
courts confused. The cases after Executive Jet, therefore, have
variously interpreted the binding nature of that case in nonaviation admiralty claims and have reached differing conclusions concerning the continued viability of the locality test. Despite its superficial retention of the locality test, Maryland v. Amerada Hess
implicitly accepted the locality-plus rule. As in most actions with
maritime locality, traditional maritime activity existed here, and
there was no need to go beyond the locality test. Amerada Hess
found the locality-plus test necessary only in perverse and casuistic
borderline situations,4 9 but only in these situations, in which the
tort is not obviously part of traditional maritime activity, is
locality-plus actually needed. Therefore, unless "perverse and
casuistic" is interpreted very strictly, the Amerada Hess standard
differs little in effect from the locality-plus rule itself. While the
court in Adams v. Montana Power Co. similary claimed to retain
the locality test, it redefined the term "navigable water" to mean
47. 485 F.2d at 524. In Kelly it is not entirely clear in the majority decision
whether in the Fifth Circuit locality-plus is necessary or whether maritime nexus
alone will suffice to grant admiralty jurisdiction in nonaviation cases. Judge
Morgan's dissenting opinion seems to be of help, as he states that "[elveryone
agrees that 'locality plus' is the test in this case." 485 F.2d at 527. He then,
however, adds that the court is not faced in Kelly with the question whether
maritime locality is necessary if the substantial maritime connection is present.
485 F.2d at 527 n.1. This leaves the present view of the Fifth Circuit unclear in
this area.
48. 409 U.S. at 268.
49. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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water in which traditional maritime activity occurs. Under Adams,
therefore, a tort not involving traditional maritime activity but
occurring on such "navigable water" would qualify for admiralty
jurisdiction, while the opposite would be true under the localityplus test. The Adams test, then, is indeed a locality test, albeit one
tempered with a redefined term that partially injects maritime
nexus into the traditional rule and whose application would only
sometimes be the same as that of the locality-plus test." Taking
the opposite view of Adams and Amerada Hess as to the scope of
the Executive Jet holding are cases such as Crosson v. Vance,
which would apply locality-plus throughout admiralty tort jurisdiction using Executive Jet as mandatory authority. In Crosson,
the Fourth Circuit interpreted Executive Jet as a selection of the
locality-plus rule generally and as a determination that the crash
of a land-based plane on an intracontinental flight was not cognizable under the new rule. Taking this approach the Crosson court
was then able to apply the locality-plus rule and use the Supreme
Court's specific disapproval of injured swimmer cases in admiralty' to decide whether traditional maritime activity existed.
Somewhere in between the two extreme interpretations of
Executive Jet's scope are such cases as Kelly v. Smith, which
adopted the locality-plus rule but used Executive Jet only as persuasive authority.
A common and significant thread running through all these
cases is the avoidance by all the courts of mechanical application
of the locality test. Such a clear trend is a positive development
since it recognizes, as the Supreme Court did in Executive Jet,
that the strict locality test is at odds with the purpose of admiralty
itself. Notwithstanding the influence of Executive Jet on all of
these adjudications, a serious lack of uniformity has arisen, greater
than that which existed with locality alone, because the courts no
longer have an established standard, and in their search for a new
standard have evinced different rates of change. The disunity is
not as great as when some courts applied strict locality and others
locality-plus (the situation before Executive Jet), but it is still at
50. This was the case in Adams. Admiralty jurisdiction would not be granted
under the locality-plus test because of a lack of traditional maritime activity, and
the result is the same using the Adams test because traditional maritime activity
does not occur on the water in question.
51. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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an undesirable level. While there is a problem with uniformity
when any rule must be applied on a case-by-case basis in different
courts, the problem is heightened to an unreasonable level when
more than one rule is used for the resolution of the same question
because there will be varying applications of each rule and further
proliferations of new rules. This is the case at hand. Although the
situation might resolve itself, hopefully the Supreme Court will
soon realize the effect of its holding in Executive Jet, have an
opportunity to make clear the scope of the locality-plus test, and
do so by giving the new test application across the entire area of
admiralty torts. By requiring a nexus to traditional maritime activity, the locality-plus test as a general standard would establish
a higher level of uniformity than exists at present while also providing a more proper delimitation on the boundaries of admiralty
52
tort jurisdiction.
Charles A. Schliebs

52. As to further refinement to keep admiralty tort jurisdiction within its
proper bounds, the Fifth Circuit has suggested several factors to determine
whether a substantial maritime nexus exists. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1973); Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th
Cir. 1972). See also Guidelines, supra note 9. The factors are likely to vary from
court to court. Even in Kelly the judges could not fully agree on the proper factors.
Also, application of the factors will vary. Certainly some jurists would differ with
the Kelly court's finding that the shooting of poachers in a small boat possessed
a substantial maritime nexus. The development in this area will probably be
similar to that of contract jurisdiction in admiralty in that over time certain types
of cases will be recognized as not possessing a sufficient maritime nature to invoke
jurisdiction.
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